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THE IMPACT OF THE CONCEPTS OF 
‘COMMON GOOD’, ‘JUSTICE’ AND ‘DIVERSITY’ 
IN THE NATURAL LAW OF OUR TIME 
Ginés Marco1
1. THE ETHICAL NATURE OF SOCIAL LIFE
Man is, by nature, a social being. The experience that the human being tends to 
society and needs it to live humanly is so clear and 
permanent that it does not take a great speculative 
effort to capture the natural character of human 
sociability. This idea has seldom been denied 
throughout the History of Philosophy. In fact, as 
John Stuart Mill (2001) states: 
“The social state is at once so 
natural, so necessary, and so 
habitual to man that, except 
in some unusual circumstances 
or by an effort of voluntary 
abstraction, he never conceives 
himself otherwise than as a 
member of a body”2(p. 32).
Social life is not, then, in man, a 
mere factual issue. When we say 
that man is social by nature we 
do not mean only that in fact he 
lives in association with others, 
for more or less pragmatic reasons, of subsistence 
or reciprocal convenience3. Undoubtedly, human 
society has much of this, but the sense of the well-
known Aristotelian affirmation - man is a political 
animal - is much deeper. This means that man 
only comes to fully manifest his humanity, only 
to develop his moral personality, to the extent 
that his life is received in the bosom of a human 
society: the family in the first place and, through it, 
the political society.
In fact, according to the classical approach, family 
and “polis” contribute, each in their own way, to 
realize the social nature of man and, to that extent, 
contribute to manifesting what it is to be human. 
Now, family and city contribute -better or worse- 
to that end, to the extent that they promote or 
not human development, according to the goods 
that - following St. Thomas - are already targeted 
in the very nature of man. Therefore, when we 
speak of family and city as “human” societies we 
do not simply refer to the fact that they are made 
up of human beings, but rather 
to the fact that they realize and 
must realize a specifically human 
way of life, and therefore are 
inherently ethical. Precisely the 
latter explains that, when it comes 
to characterizing them, we cannot 
settle for factual explanations, 
since the human, insofar as it is 
ethical, is not purely factual: it 
includes - as Ana Marta González 
(2008) affirms - always an original 
tension towards the order of 
duty to be. Just as every man is 
human, but he can always realize his humanity 
with greater perfection, so every human society 
is intrinsically ethical. This, however, does not 
prevent him from realizing his ethical condition 
with greater perfection.
To better appreciate the intrinsically ethical 
character of human society, as something that 
distinguishes, this society from other animal 
societies, we can use a valuable observation of 
Aristotle (2005), who saw a connection between 
the peculiar human sociability, language and 
communication about what fair and unjust:
Just as every man is 
human, but he can 
always realize his 
humanity with greater 
perfection, so every 
human society is 
intrinsically ethical.
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The reason why man is a social being, 
more than any bee and that any 
gregarious animal, is evident: nature, as 
we say, does nothing in vain, and man is 
the only animal that has a word. For the 
voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and 
that is why other animals also possess it, 
because their nature reaches a sensation of 
pain and pleasure and indicates it to each 
other. But the word is to show what is 
convenient and what is harmful, as well as 
what is just and unjust, and other values, 
and the community participation of these 
things constitutes the home and the ‘polis’ 
(Aristotle, 2005: I, 2, 1253 a, 11-13: p. 4).
The word, unlike the voice, does not only serve to 
manifest subjective states of pleasure and pain -as 
is the case of animals- but also objective contents, 
based on which a different type of community can 
be constituted. Among those objective contents, 
verbally communicable, Aristotle highlights those 
that refer to the usefulness or convenience of 
things for certain purposes, but also justice.
Indeed, as Aristotle (2005) explains elsewhere, 
justice consists of a “certain equality”, or 
proportional equality, which can be determined 
by prudential judgment (p. 89). Now precisely, 
justice as a virtue requires of man the willingness 
to submit to such a judgment, even in the case that 
such submission supposes contradicting the most 
immediate particular interests. Man, precisely of 
his possibility of escaping from the immediacy, is 
radically different from other animals. And in this 
also lies the greatest difference between animal and 
human society.
Now, as we noted above, the properly human 
social life is structured in different types of 
communities, and it is not possible to dispense 
with such structuring - as political liberalism 
defends - without depriving man of essential 
ethical referents for his practical life. As we know, 
Aristotle himself refers to the family, the village 
and the city - or political society proper - although 
later he focuses almost exclusively on the analysis 
of the house and the city. Among them, it detects 
an essential difference, which should be kept in 
mind when reflecting on the just and the unjust in 
the configuration of public life.
2. FAMILY AND POLIS
Adopting a genetic perspective, that is, a 
perspective that deals with the former in the 
temporal order, it would be necessary to say that 
the house is prior to the city. However, adopting 
a teleological perspective, by which we discover 
the essentials of a reality in the form it presents 
when it has been fully developed, we would have 
to say the opposite, namely, that the city “precedes 
the house and every one of us, because the whole 
is necessarily prior to the part” (Aristotle, 2005, 
p. 4). In fact, Aristotle understands that only by 
reference to the common political good can man 
discover and realize the good initiated in his own 
nature. And, with everything, the same city cannot 
be constituted without houses and families, “…
because every city is made up of houses” (Aristotle, 
2005, p. 5). Therefore, all just order of the city 
must begin by considering the nature and specific 
contribution of the family to the constitution of 
human good.
2.1. The necessary and the free
According to Aristotle (2005), the family is a 
place of coexistence designed to satisfy the most 
immediate needs of life, without which man can 
hardly enter to form part of the political society 
proper (p. 3). The trait presented by the family is 
its imperfection because it lacks self-sufficiency, 
in such a way that it is more constrained by the 
necessary than by the free. On the other hand, the 
characteristic object of political society is not so 
much to satisfy the most immediate and urgent 
needs of life, but rather to make a form of free 
coexistence possible - in the sense of “liberated” 
from what is necessary or not constrained by what 
is necessary. For Aristotle, only the latter is an end 
in itself, but this must be understood well.
Following Ana Marta González (2008), when 
Aristotle suggests that only political coexistence, 
insofar as it is a free coexistence, is an end in itself, 
is not wanting to belittle the moral value of other 
activities. Undoubtedly, being good in itself is a 
feature of any morally good act: Aristotle (2009) 
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himself says it more than once: “good deed is itself 
an end” (p. 103). However, good deed is also an 
integral part of an activity that is no longer, in 
turn, a means to any other activity or activity other 
than itself. As we know, this activity is designated 
by Aristotle with a name, eudaimonia, and, as 
we also know, Aristotle himself experienced a 
hesitation in determining whether the eudaimonia 
in question, the happy life, properly consisted in a 
contemplative activity or had rather than looking 
for it in political life, understood in the previous 
terms: as a coexistence of free and equal.
From this perspective, it is unquestionable that 
the free activity in itself is 
contemplation.
But immediately, then, human 
coexistence should be placed 
not focused on satisfying needs, 
nor on productive activities, 
but purely and simply on living 
together in freedom -in which the 
allusion to the self-government 
of free men is implicit. Precisely 
for this reason, beyond his 
determined commitment to 
contemplation as an essential 
activity of happiness absolutely 
considered, Aristotle does not renounce to place in 
the political life the content of human happiness.
Politics, in the Aristotelian sense of expression, is 
a uniquely human activity because it begins only 
where everywhere needs are met. In this sense 
it reveals a first form of self-transcendence of 
man. Below the policy, still focused on the mere 
satisfaction of needs - or, as the case may be, on 
the production of goods that are only ordered, 
more or less sophisticatedly to the satisfaction of 
needs - is Economy.
2.2. Economy and politics
According to Aristotle, a correct economy must 
not lose sight of the fact that the satisfaction of 
the necessities of life only are considered if they 
contribute to reach the good life. In other words, 
that the Economy as such is subordinated to 
the Politics, and not vice versa. Consequently, 
decisions made with the sole criterion of 
administering the goods and satisfying needs, 
without further projection into the good life, are 
ethically deviant. The fact that Aristotle confined 
the Economy in the strict sense to the family has to 
do with it: for Aristotle, the only natural place to 
satisfy the needs of life is the family, and a family 
only fulfills its function if it enables its members 
to participate in a political community, formed by 
free and equal principles.
The Aristotelian idea according to which the 
Economy should be confined to the house has 
been criticized a lot, mainly by the precursors 
of neoclassical economy. His 
position, however, is much 
more understandable when we 
approach the question from the 
point of view of the subordination 
of the necessary to the free. From 
then on, it may not be necessary 
to think that the Economy as 
such should be confined to the 
house: it is enough to retain that, 
no matter where the economic 
activity is developed, it must not 
lose sight of its subordination to 
Politics, understood as Aristotle 
does, as the coexistence of free and equal. That 
is to say: Economy finds its ethical north when 
it is oriented to make possible the coexistence of 
free and equal. Now, there is a sense in which this 
certainly directly implies a reference to the house: 
concretely, when we consider the most immediate 
ethical horizon of the work activity. In effect: 
work, for what it has of economic relationship, 
belongs more directly to the family relationship 
than to the political relationship, and therefore 
when it becomes independent of any relationship 
with the common good of the family, distortions 
easily appear in the human life.
For the rest, the Aristotelian thesis according to 
which the Economy is to be subordinated to the 
Politics also extends to other matters. This allows 
us to understand, for example, the criticism that 
Aristotle (2005, p. 81) directs to all those who 
“convert their activities into chrematistics”, that is, 
…Politics, understood 
as Aristotle does, as the 
coexistence of free and equal. 
That is to say: Economy finds 
its ethical north when it is 
oriented to make possible the 
coexistence of free and equal.
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they subordinate all their activities to profit, since 
such a thing supposes denaturalizing the activities.4 
When this same thought is transferred to the 
public service we talk about corruption.
In another order of things, this way of 
approaching the relationship between Economy 
and Politics supposes that the Politics has a 
positive content -the coexistence between free and 
equal men- and that such content does not appear 
by the mere fact of having common commercial 
interests or ensuring the reciprocal rights.
Indeed, according to Aristotle (2005):
the ‘polis’ is not a community of place to 
prevent reciprocal injustices and with a 
view to exchange. These things, without 
a doubt, are necessarily given if the 
city exists, but not because all of them 
exist, there is already a city, but this is 
a community of houses and families to 
live well, with the aim of a perfect and 
autarchic life. (p. 81)
According to such words, what is distinctive about 
the political relationship itself is that it revolves 
not simply around life, but around the good life.
Thus, Aristotle clearly distinguishes the domestic-
economic and political. Accordingly, neither the 
conjugal relationship, nor the paternal-subsidiary, 
nor the sheriff -between the master and the slave- 
are political relations. Nor is the artisan and the 
apprentice. Unlike all these relationships -defined 
by some kind of need-, only the relations between 
free and equal -so the relationships not marked 
by daily needs or economic interests- are properly 
speaking political relations. What defines the 
political perspective, therefore, is the consideration 
of men as free and equal, without prejudice to 
other differences that undoubtedly occur between 
them when things are considered from another 
perspective.
2.3. Justice and politics
The way to realize the political perspective is 
the introduction of considerations of justice, 
since justice is defined, precisely, as “a certain 
equality” (Aristotle, 2005, p. 81). Certainly, it is 
not a strict equality, but proportional. And, as 
we know, Aristotle distinguishes two types of 
proportion: the arithmetic, which must govern the 
modes of treatment between individuals, and the 
geometric, which must govern the distributions 
of charges and benefits according to merit, all 
under the protection of the law that, founding 
the notion of legal justice, is directly ordered to 
protect the common good. Indeed, according to 
Aristotle (2005), “…the political good is justice, 
that is, what is convenient for the community” 
(p. 81), but such political justice only “…exists 
between people who share a common life to make 
autarchy possible, free and equal persons, already 
proportional and arithmetically” (Aristotle, 2009, 
p. 90).
From the Aristotelian approach we can infer 
that the prospering of political relations are 
only possible if, above the possible relations of 
economic dependence that are established between 
men, as well as their different economic benefits 
to the community, they are all recognized as 
equal before the law, simply because all of them 
contribute in some measure with their actions and 
their judgment, to a different kind of coexistence, 
no longer governed in this case by necessity or 
utility. Determining to what extent they contribute 
to it is a matter of justice, and this kind of justice 
is what is safeguarded by law, which, according to 
Aristotle (2005) “is the middle ground” (p. 203).
This does not mean that the Policy is exhausted in 
the enactment of laws. However, legislation is an 
essential part of the Policy. Aristotle (2009) says 
of the laws that “…come to be the works of the 
Policy” (p. 202), because they introduce order in 
the whole of the coexistence, defining the limits 
beyond of which the common good is violated, or 
seriously attacked against others.
In any case, with the introduction of the political 
perspective, obviously, it is not about annulling 
the differences that persist among citizens from 
other points of view, nor is it about considering the 
different contributions they give to the community 
from their fields irrelevant respective. It is only 
about recognizing that, above or below, each and 
every one of these services, they are all equal as 
citizens.
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In the latter, as pointed out above, the political 
community is clearly distinguished from the family 
community, since the latter is not a community 
of free and equal, because it is essentially marked 
by the satisfaction of needs. Basically, the spouses 
need each other and the children need their 
parents. Certainly, when they come of age, they 
are all equal before the law. But within the family 
community there is no equality but difference, 
and precisely because of this detail the relations 
that exist between them are not political either. 
Consequently, among them “…there can be no 
political justice of one respect to the others, but 
only justice in a certain sense and by analogy” 
(Aristotle, 2009, p. 202).
In fact, “…there is justice... for those whose 
relationships are regulated by a law” (Aristotle, 
2009, p. 91). However, according to Aristotle, 
only “…those who are equal in command and 
in obedience…” (2009, p. 92) have a natural 
law.5 Such a thing is in principle possible within 
the political community - and that is precisely 
the notion of citizenship; it is not, however, in 
the case of family relationships, where parents 
naturally have authority over their children. For 
this reason, only in the case of the relationship 
between husband and wife does Aristotle admit a 
certain concept of justice, domestic justice, which, 
however, is also distinguished from political justice 
itself.
Certainly, in the case of family relations it seems 
that justice is little and friendship should be 
better talked about. At the end of the day, “…
when men are friends (Aristotle, 2009, p. 143), 
there is no need for justice, while even if they are 
righteous, they also need friendship”. And yet, 
it is also true that, according to all appearances, 
“it is the righteous who are most capable of 
friendship” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 142), and “…it is 
natural that justice grows together with friendship, 
since both occur in the same and have the same 
extension” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 153). In any case, 
friendship requires a community of life: without 
this, friendship cannot develop, and that is why 
the different types of communities are at the base 
of the different types of friendship. Thus, next to 
a friendship based on superiority - as occurs, for 
example, between parents and children - there is 
a civic friendship, like the one that must be given 
between free and equal citizens.
2.4. Complementarity between family and polis in 
education
As we can see, it is important not to confuse 
or separate the family logic and the political 
logic, since these are two different entities. The 
distinction between them, however, does not 
exclude their complementarity. On the contrary, 
family logic and political logic are reciprocally 
complementary if we consider things in relation to 
the ultimate goal of ethics: to make a man a good 
man.
In fact, in order to reach this purpose, it is 
necessary that the child receives the appropriate 
education from a young age, in such a way that 
later, in his adult age, he lives “given to good 
occupations”, and does not do “neither against 
his will not voluntarily what is bad” (Aristotle, 
2009, p. 199). All of this, however, “…will not 
be possible except for those who live according 
to a certain intelligence and a right order that 
has strength” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 200). And it is 
precisely at this point that there is an aspect of 
that complementarity between family and politics 
that is necessary for the attainment of human life, 
because, as Aristotle (2009) observes, “the father’s 
orders have no force or obligation, nor do they 
generally of no isolated man, unless he is a king or 
something similar; on the other hand, the law has 
obligatory force and is the expression of a certain 
prudence and intelligence” (p. 200).
Aristotle considers that family and polis contribute 
-each in its own way- to the realization of the 
human good, that is, that every man becomes a 
good man, which supposes, among other things, 
the formation for political life. Certainly, Aristotle 
(2009) also observes that if the city neglects these 
questions, “…it must correspond to each one to 
direct his children and his friends to virtue, and to 
be able to do it, or at least propose it” (p. 201). In 
reality, this task is always the special competence 
of parents and friends, because by their proximity 
and closeness they are in a better position to be 
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right in particular cases. All in all, his opinion 
is that he will be better able to deal with each 
individual case, who knows in general what is 
convenient for everyone, and in principle, this 
is the legislator, although this knowledge is also 
convenient for parents and educators.
In fact, although the father and the educator 
attend first to the good of the individual, insofar 
as the human individual is not perfected but by 
reference to the political community in which he 
lives, this implies that the educational task will not 
be successful unless you have the common good 
before your eyes. On the other hand, although the 
legislator must first attend to the common good, he 
must not lose sight of the fact that said common 
good, in order to be so, must be perfective of 
the individual man and that, for that reason, its 
provisions on education (Aristotle, 2009, p. 84), 
will have to act in accordance with human nature.
Undoubtedly, given that the legislator’s work 
inevitably involves  interference in the moral life of 
the individual, it is important to have a criterion 
that distinguishes education from manipulation 
or corruption, and this criterion, implicit in all 
practical reasoning, is none other than nature. 
Indeed, as Aristotle (2009) says, “it is not the same 
to be a good man and be a good citizen of any 
regime” (p. 84), because there are corrupt regimes 
that enact laws in line with the regime and whose 
corruption, however, is recognizable, precisely 
because they violate the natural basis of human 
coexistence - what we might call the natural 
sense of justice, which is not only relative to the 
determined political regime, but not completely 
alien to it either.
3. NATURAL AND LEGAL LAW
According to Aristotle (2009), natural law is 
distinguished from legal law, but it conforms to 
what we call political right. Thus, he writes, “…
political justice is divided into natural and legal; 
natural, which has the same force everywhere, 
regardless of whether it looks like it or not, and 
legal that of what, at first does not matter what it 
is or otherwise, but that once established no longer 
gives the same” (p. 92).
As we see in the words of Aristotle, natural 
law appears as part of the political right. It is, 
therefore, a present and operative right in the 
polis, between free and equal citizens. It is not a 
pre-political right, as an abstract code that should 
be looked at when promulgating the legal right 
or examining its justice; but it is a right implicit 
in the practical reasoning of man historically 
situated and that, nevertheless, is distinguished by 
its origin from the purely legal right. We could say 
that, in the absence of ideological conditioning or 
tyrannical partisanship, the legal right for Aristotle 
is limited to specifying or determining the limits of 
the just and unjust in a given society. By doing this, 
it already incorporates the provisions of natural 
law. This thought is also implicit in the Thomist 
thesis according to which one must always judge 
according to written laws:
Judgment is nothing other than a certain 
definition or determination of what is 
just; but a thing is made fair in two ways: 
either by its very nature, what is called 
natural right, or by a certain convention 
among men, what is called positive law 
... Laws, however, are written for the 
declaration of both rights, although in a 
different way. For the written law contains 
the natural right, but does not institute 
it, since it does not take force from the 
law but from nature: but the writing of 
the law contains and institutes positive 
law, giving it the force of authority. That 
is why it is necessary that the judgment 
be made on the written law, because 
otherwise the trial would depart from the 
natural right, or from the just positive. 
(Aquinas, 2009, p. 3.263)
In that text, St. Thomas opportunely distinguishes 
between the institution of law and its presence or 
use by man. There is no doubt that, from this last 
perspective, the citizen as soon uses the natural 
right as the positive one. In fact, it would have 
to be said that, ordinarily, whenever the citizen 
uses positive law, he also makes use of the natural 
right. However, this does not mean that the source 
of both rights is the same, or that they have been 
instituted in the same way. For while the legal or 
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positive right takes its force and its origin from 
the convention of men, natural law takes its force 
and its origin from nature - that is, from natural 
reason, from reason that takes charge of the ends-
goods to which our inclinations point. Therefore, 
in the response to the first objection of the same 
article, St. Thomas observes:
Just as the written law does not give 
force to natural law, neither can it be 
diminished or taken away from it, since 
the will of man cannot change nature. 
Therefore, if the written law contains 
something against the natural right, it is 
unjust, and has no force to bind, because 
the positive law is only applicable when 
it is indifferent to the natural right that 
a thing be done in one way or another ... 
Hence, such scriptures are not called laws, 
but rather corruptions of the law, and, 
therefore, should not be judged according 
to them. (Aquinas, 2009, p. 3.264)
St. Thomas is obviously thinking of the “wicked 
laws”. This name is reserved, precisely, to the laws 
that contradict the natural right “or always or 
in the largest number of cases” (Aquinas, 2009, 
p. 3.265). Now, as he himself observes, it would 
also go against the natural right in case we insist 
on observing a written law that in principle is 
just, but that, applied to a specific case, in which 
special circumstances occur, it is not.6 St. Thomas 
refers to those cases whose right judgment requires 
the exercise of equity or epikeia. This virtue is 
not a different virtue of justice itself, but it does 
represent a higher form of justice than legal justice, 
since it is introduced precisely to correct the 
possible effect derived from applying the written 
law in certain cases.
Equity or epikeia had been referred to by Aristotle 
in similar terms:
Equitable is fair, but not in the sense of the 
law, but as a rectification of legal justice. The 
reason for this is that the law is universal, and 
there are things that cannot be treated correctly 
in a universal way. Therefore, when the law is 
universally expressed and something that is outside 
the universal formulation emerges, then it is fine, 
where the legislator does not reach and errs by 
simplifying, correcting the omission, what the 
legislator himself would have said if he had been 
there and would have stated in the law if he had 
known. That is why fairness is fair, and better than 
a kind of justice; not absolute justice, but the error 
produced by its absolute nature. (Aquinas, 2009, 
p. 3.285)
Well, the very fact that we can discuss the justice 
or injustice derived from applying a law in 
principle just to a given case is indicative that legal 
justice is not the last word in matters of justice. 
As Robert Spaemann (1973) has warned, the fact 
that it is relevant to discuss the justice or injustice 
of a positive law, legally promulgated, responds 
to the fact that the interlocutors know that there 
is something that is just in itself, even though it is 
sometimes recognized by the power established 
and others not. Whoever really accepted legal 
positivism would close to himself the possibility of 
participating in this type of debate after the entry 
into force of a law.
In fact, the existence of equity is an indirect 
confirmation of the existence of a natural right 
not always introduced in a code, but operative. 
That natural right is that we use spontaneously in 
all those cases not yet covered by the legal right, 
and that often lead us to speak -as Ana Marta 
González (2008) points out- of “legal vacuums” 
and demand a codification.
Thus, natural law, as understood by Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas, is not an ahistorical right, but is 
called to materialize and take a specific historical 
form through its positivization in different legal 
codes, to the extent that said Codes actually 
pursue introducing order in relationships that 
occur between members of a given community. 
This is so because whatever is fair in such 
relationships cannot be determined absolutely 
a priori. This is followed by words of Aristotle 
(2009) that would otherwise be truly obscure: “for 
us there is a natural justice, and yet all justice is 
variable: nevertheless, there is a natural and a non-
natural justice. But it is clear which of the things 
that can be otherwise is natural and which is not 
natural but legal or conventional, although both 
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are equally mutable” (p. 92).
Despite writing shortly before, in the same 
place, that “what is by nature is immutable 
and has everywhere the same force, just as fire 
burns both here and in Persia”, Aristotle has no 
objection to accept that “all justice is variable”. 
St. Thomas is not far behind, and so he writes in 
his commentary: “among men, who are among 
the corruptible, was added to the physical nature 
a second nature, in essential level or by accident” 
(Aquinas, 1987, p. 240), which does not prevent 
him from affirming the existence of a natural 
right that is valid for all men. The only way to 
understand both statements together is to note, 
on the one hand, that the definition of man as a 
social animal involves admitting as many positive 
realizations of human nature as there are social 
forms throughout history. And notice, on the 
other hand, that this does not nullify the idea of  
natural law, which lasts, precisely, as a negative 
criterion: there are actions that, no matter what 
the historical determinations of human nature, 
nor what the reasons are about the most useful for 
human coexistence, they can never be considered 
natural, because, far from constituting a concretion 
of something that nature leaves indeterminate, 
they involve a direct contradiction to the goods 
that we recognize positively initiated in our natural 
inclinations.
As inheritor of modernity, we can feel the impulse 
to complete the classic doctrine of natural 
law with a clear affirmation of the dignity of 
the human person, which excludes any purely 
instrumental consideration of the human being 
and allows, therefore, to recognize everything 
biologically human as subject of political and 
social rights. This thought was introduced in the 
modern age with the different theories of natural 
rights, and codified later in the later universal 
declarations of human rights. Among the initiators 
of this revolutionary idea, there were many 
who appealed to biblical and Christian sources 
from which, in their opinion, the appropriate 
consequences had not been extracted. This is 
the case of the voluntarist thesis of Duns Scoto 
(1987) and William of Ockham (1990). These two 
authors rewrite the biblical and Christian sources 
about the foundations of legal rules.
However, progress in this direction has suffered 
an abrupt reversal in our time, with the denial of 
such rights to the unborn, despite their biologically 
human condition. Likewise, the loss of the 
classical context of natural law, with its definition 
of the minimum framework of the common 
good, has meant the introduction of a dangerous 
misunderstanding in the use of human rights that, 
in our days, are invoked to defend a thing as the 
opposite. From this last point we have a clear 
example in the debate about euthanasia: when we 
start talking about the right to death in the same 
plane of the right to life, we appeal to a highly 
individualistic conception of law that, ultimately, 
threatens by its base all the legal order.
Indeed, assuming that any individual desire 
must find an echo in the legal system, the latter 
automatically ceases to be the guarantor of 
the common good to become the arbitrator 
of supposed individual benefits. However, this 
movement is far from being harmless, because it 
involves the denial of a common human good, 
of which life, but not death, is an integral and 
essential part: a common good by reference to 
which some decisions are more just than others. 
Now, precisely because life, but not death, is 
an integral part of the common human good, 
when an alleged right to death is invoked, it is 
assumed that there is no common good, or that the 
common good does not have any objective content 
at all; it is assumed, in short, that there are only 
subjective visions or individual interests, more or 
less changing, that can be tilted as much by life as 
by death; and that the task of the public powers is 
to arbitrate between such preferences or interests, 
although to give greater solemnity to the political 
task appeals to a supposed “general interest”.
This worldview can be sustained, in theory, on 
the basis of an extreme liberalism that disguises 
as love of individual freedom the lack of love for 
one’s own life or that of others as soon as it does 
not meet certain conditions of quality. In practice, 
it involves introducing a genuine investment 
of values: once the presumed right to death is 
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accepted in the legal system, or - without going so 
far - once euthanasia is decriminalized, any patient 
whose care requires a considerable effort on the 
part of his relatives is defenseless against the social 
pressure that more or less tacitly encourages him 
to request euthanasia and, in this way, free his 
beloved relatives from the cumbersome task of 
caring for him. Whoever, in view of the efforts 
of the family or the state, would not choose to 
die would be labeled as selfish. With this, the 
investment of securities is complete.
4. Current Questions Around the Common Good
To the extent that the process of modernization 
involves a process of individualization, the notion 
of the common good tends to disappear from 
the ethical horizon of the agent. This follows a 
remarkable impoverishment of human life, because 
man only reaches its characteristic fullness to the 
extent that it relates to their peers and founds a 
community based on the word, in the conversation 
about the just and the unjust, what is useful and 
what is harmful.
Indeed, the properly human community exists 
only insofar as the word is not simply a rhetorical 
instrument at the service of particular interests, 
but a means to communicate the true and the 
just. Hence, relativism threatens by its base any 
properly human form of coexistence. Where 
the interest for the truth fades, other interests 
flourish, which are not capable of founding open 
communities. But-someone could object-: does the 
truth found open communities? Are there other 
alternatives? In the following sections we will try 
to answer these questions.
4.1. Fundamentalism and relativism
The term “fundamentalist”, as we use it in 
this study, has no particular transcendental 
connotations. Rather, in etymological key, 
“fundamentalist” is anyone who adheres to 
the foundations, but refuses to develop them 
rationally, gathering from others a nod not 
justified with reasons. Developing the foundations, 
in effect, is the work of reason, because this is 
a discursive power, whose most proper task is 
certainly to move from principles to conclusions 
and conclusions to principles. Such a discourse is 
called “science” when we move on the theoretical 
plane, and “prudence” when we move on the 
practical plane. From this perspective, what defines 
fundamentalism is more the renunciation of or the 
inability to rationally articulate one’s convictions, 
than the fact that such convictions are of a 
religious nature.
Now, from this point of view, the relativist 
himself is also a type of fundamentalist. For the 
relativist may have his reasons, but in thinking 
that each one also has his or her own, and also 
assuming that no one has to be in principle more 
relevant than the others, indirectly raises his own 
relativism to a single relevant reason. From here, 
its only difference with the fundamentalist is 
only of a practical and provisional nature. Thus, 
while the fundamentalist does not renounce in 
principle to assert his ideas in a violent way, the 
relativist seems to reject in principle such recourse 
to violence. However, its denying of the truth 
also implies a violence to the nature of things: if 
no opinion can be, in principle, moretrue than 
the opposite, then the use of the word loses all 
communicating virtuality in a double sense: 
neither communicates anything true nor founds 
true community. Under these conditions, the use 
of the word can only have a rhetorical purpose: to 
persuade the other of my opinions and, ultimately, 
of my interests. Relativism thus becomes an excuse 
for the strongest to dominate the weakest.
Faced with both positions, it is important to 
emphasize the rationality of the classical approach, 
for which there can only be community if there are 
shared reasons, of which some are conventional, 
while others are natural. The classic doctrine of 
natural law, in effect, constitutes an undeniable 
framework when finding shared reasons.
Certainly, as a moral doctrine and not just a legal 
one, the doctrine of natural law covers more things 
than natural law. Thus, although St. Thomas 
takes up the classical doctrine of natural law, in 
his brief exposition of the goods associated with 
rational inclination, one can call attention to a 
peculiar aspect, which is not equally emphasized 
in that approach: the duty to avoid ignorance 
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and, therefore, to seek the truth. This duty is 
a requirement that makes us the natural law 
and that cannot be translated into legal terms. 
However, that requirement of natural law is at the 
base of the same legal system because, if the search 
for truth lapses, social life easily falls prey to 
considerations of another type - purely pragmatic 
and, in the last analysis, balances of power. We 
thus enter into the vicious circle characteristic of 
the relativist society, because it is a fact that the 
duty to seek the truth can also be stimulated or, on 
the contrary, weakened, as a consequence of the 
appreciation or lack of public appreciation for the 
truth.
At the same time, the fact that St. Thomas 
speaks of the truth as something that must be 
sought supposes admitting a right to search, and, 
therefore, to the freedom to search. Faced with 
fundamentalist positions, which require a non-
argumentative recognition of a body of truths, it 
must be remembered that political life, in the strict 
sense, although it certainly presupposes an interest 
in truth, as something of a natural law, does not 
suppose more shared than those that are known as 
“natural right”.
Certainly, historical development can lead to a 
concrete community building its social life on a 
broader and deeper body of truths and, insofar 
as such truths are assimilated and incorporated 
into the way of life, they will become part of the 
common law not written, which is as much as 
saying a natural right in a derivative sense. Indeed, 
asked if natural law can change, St. Thomas 
Aquinas (2009) answers:
…change can be conceived in two ways: 
first, because something is added to it. And 
in that sense, nothing prevents the natural 
law from changing, because in fact there 
are many useful provisions for human life 
that have been added to the natural law, 
both by divine law and, even, by human 
laws. (p. 3.632)
It is implicit in these words that the progress of 
human law, in so far as it is just and oriented 
towards the common good, can be considered as a 
natural law.
But historical development can also lead to a 
change in this last aspect. Thus, asked if human 
law can change, St. Thomas answers:
Human law is an opinion of reason, 
according to which, human acts are 
directed. Hence, to legitimately change 
it, there can be two reasons: one on the 
part of reason and the other on the part 
of men whose acts the law regulates. 
On the part of reason, because it seems 
innate to human reason to gradually 
advance from the imperfect to the perfect 
... and thus we see ... that the first ones 
that tried to discover something useful 
for the constitution of human society, 
not being able to take it all into account, 
they established imperfect norms and full 
of gaps, which were later modified and 
replaced by others with less deficiencies 
in the service of the common good. In 
turn, on the part of the men whose acts 
it regulates, the law can be legitimately 
modified by the change of human 
conditions, which in their differences 
require different approaches. (Aquinas, 
2009, p. 3.664)
According to these words, it seems clear that 
not every change in the legislation is illegitimate: 
although it is true that there are irrational and 
unjust changes, because they do not serve the 
common good, there are others that may be 
necessary when there are notable changes in the 
constitution of the population, perhaps because 
people from other traditions and with stronger 
convictions than the indigenous community are 
incorporated into the community. In these cases, a 
redefinition of public order seems inevitable which 
has as an immutable point of reference the natural 
law.
4.2. Universalism and culturalism
Broadly speaking, the conflict can be defined in the 
following terms: while the universalist maintains 
that there are universal reasons that can be shared 
by all, regardless of their cultural origin, the 
culturalist objects that these universal reasons are 
universal only in appearance, since that, in reality, 
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they are the fruit of a particular culture. In this 
case, the particular culture is referred to as Western 
culture. 
It should be noted that the culturalist-who is 
nothing but a cultural relativist-argues from a 
theoretical position that to a large extent derives 
its strength from the substantivization of the 
concept of culture. That is to say, it argues as if 
culture were a static reality, as if it were not a 
practical reality configured and configurable along 
the lines of theoretical and practical solutions of a 
given human community to the various challenges 
that nature or history poses.
However, precisely the coexistence of people of 
diverse cultural origin in the same society, as well 
as the presence of diverse cultural communities 
under the same political framework, constitutes 
an unprecedented practical challenge for all those 
involved: for those people and their communities, 
as well as for the indigenous cultural community.
The fact that it is a practical challenge makes 
secondary the conflict between universalism and 
culturalism, as has been stated above in terms 
of theory. For from a practical point of view the 
question is no longer whether cultural minorities 
can or cannot share universal ideas of justice, or 
if they have other ideas of justice, but purely and 
simply under what conditions can we live in such a 
way that we do not offend each other reciprocally 
and do not live as strangers among us. That is, 
how to build a community beyond our differences.
Additionally, at this point we consider that 
without a minimum reference to human nature, 
as well as to the goods that belong to the 
integrity of that nature, it is not possible to forge 
a reciprocal understanding between members 
of diverse cultures. For which a very nuanced 
notion of universalism will be needed, but not 
to the uprooted way as it has sometimes been 
posed by some sector of the doctrine but rather 
as a universalism rooted in the very dynamics of 
socially situated human life and appealing from 
the beginning to a practical rationality.
In any case, the law that provides the framework 
for coexistence is guided by a basic criterion 
pointed out by Thomas Aquinas: “not to offend 
those with whom one has to converse” (2009, 
p. 3.631). It is well understood that, beyond 
its diverse cultural achievements, the minimum 
guidelines of what constitutes an offense are found 
in nature itself, and that this same nature asks us 
to develop a sense of community.
5. PLURALISM AND NATURAL LAW
Precisely because man only realizes his nature 
to the extent that he participates freely and 
responsibly in that conversation that is at the base 
of the common good, any position that endangers 
that conversation constitutes a threat to the 
common good and, ultimately, to man himself.
Without a doubt, it is necessary to participate in 
the conversation about what is just and unjust 
and, nevertheless, to violate the common good. 
Any disobedience of the law constitutes such 
a threat and, otherwise, any attack against the 
special justice, that is, any attack against the men 
with whom one has to converse, is also an offense 
- albeit indirect - to the common benefit.
But the characteristic of the present moment is 
not reflected so much in these types of attacks 
against justice as in the very questioning of the 
conversation without which we cannot even 
speak of the common good. Above, we referred 
to individualism and relativism as threats to that 
conversation. While individualism designates a 
sociological reality, relativism designates a cultural 
reality. At the political level, the confluence of both 
phenomena translates into the development of a 
moral pluralism that undermines the possibility of 
a true political community. From here we could 
only speak of associations with a view to exchange 
or to guarantee reciprocal rights.
As Zygmunt Bauman (1997) has indicated, 
fundamentalism can be considered a reaction 
to the risks implicit in these two threats, 
which deprive the individual of all community 
and philosophical support. However, the 
fundamentalist reaction is also a threat, and 
serious, against the constituent conversation of 
social life, simply because one way or another 
comes to consider it superfluous. In the latter, 
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fundamentalism betrays its fundamental 
incompatibility with politics. In its desire 
to counteract the solvent moral pluralism, 
fundamentalism comes to deny the legitimate 
political pluralism.
In fact, the possibility of communicating one’s own 
thoughts, expressing one’s opinion on the issues 
that concern all of us, is part of the very essence 
of political life. This fact is also at the base of 
political pluralism, which cannot be confused with 
moral pluralism: while moral pluralism designates 
a fundamental discrepancy in the plane of 
principles, political pluralism designates a practical 
discrepancy in the level of solutions to the 
problems that arise in the thread of coexistence.
Certainly, issues related to coexistence are judged 
by each from their own perspective, with their 
history and interests. Nevertheless, this does not 
in itself constitute an obstacle to coexistence, but 
is precisely what is required for conversation, and 
so that the determination of the just, that is, the 
allocation to each one of what corresponds to 
it, is not done without taking into consideration 
the way in which the goods that are object of 
discussion affect each one of the citizens.
However, the same political pluralism requires an 
agreement on moral principles: there are assets 
that cannot be publicly challenged without at the 
same time questioning the bases of coexistence. 
This fact alone constitutes an ethical reason to 
subtract them from the public debate, although 
there is no problem in questioning them on a 
theoretical level, for example in an academic 
context. Just as one cannot experiment with 
humans, one cannot experiment with the bases 
of human coexistence: such a thing, indeed, 
amounts to experimenting with men, and nobody 
is legitimated to do so. The difference between 
government and manipulation resides precisely 
in the recognition that the common good is not 
constituted against the goods initiated in the 
human nature itself, but only in conformity with 
them, and, therefore, respecting the natural law, 
true manifestation of the eternal law instituted by 
God.
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NOTES
1 Faculty of Philosophy – Catholic University of 
Valencia. E-mail: gines.marco@ucv.es.
2 Stuart Mill, J. (2001). Utilitarianism [orig.: 1863]. 
Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, p. 32.
3 As Aristotle argues: “It has been said in the first 
exhibitions... that man is by nature a political animal, 
and, therefore, even without needing reciprocal help, 
men tend to coexist. However, the common utility 
also unites them, insofar as each one encourages 
participation in the good life. This is, in effect, the 
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main purpose, both of all in common and in isolation. 
But they also meet by mere living, and constitute the 
political community. For perhaps in the mere fact of 
living there is a certain part of the good, if in life the 
penalties do not predominate too much. It is evident that 
most men endure many sufferings because of their lively 
desire to live, as if there were a certain happiness and 
natural sweetness in life” (2005: III, 6, 1278 b 3, p. 77).
4 Alasdair MacIntyre will use in his work After virtue 
(1981), the expression “external goods” to refer to those 
goods that, because they are common to many practices, 
can denaturalize the genuine meaning of a practice, 
which only it is enriched if its participants use the so-
called “internal goods”.
5 “A citizen without any other rank is better defined 
than by participating in judicial functions and in 
government” Aristotle (2005: III, 1, 1275 b, p. 69). 
For that reason, Aristotle says that being a citizen 
is an indefinite magistracy, which is above all true 
of democratic regimes. “But the definition of citizen 
admits a correction; in the other regimes, the indefinite 
magistrate is not a member of the assembly and judge, 
but rather a determined magistracy; because all these 
or some of them have been entrusted with the power to 
deliberate and judge on all matters or on some. After 
this it is clear who the citizen is: who has the possibility 
of participating in the deliberative or judicial function, 
we call that citizen of that city; and we call the city, to 
put it briefly, the set of such citizens enough to live with 
self-sufficiency” (2005: III, 1, 1275 b 12, p.69).
6 “Just as iniquitous laws by themselves contradict 
natural law, or always or in the greatest number of cases, 
in the same way laws that are rightly established are 
deficient in some cases, in which, if observed, it would 
go against the natural right. And therefore, in such cases, 
should not be judged according to the literality of the 
law, but should be resorted to equity, which tends the 
legislator. Hence, the Judge says: “Neither the reason 
of right nor the benignity of equity suffer that what has 
been introduced in the interest of men is interpreted too 
harshly against their benefit, leading to severity. In such 
cases, even the legislator himself would judge otherwise, 
and if he had foreseen it he would have determined it in 
the law” (Aquinas, 2009: II, II, q. 60, to 5 ad 2, p. 3.265)
